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Abstract: This Trends article discusses questions surrounding whether the Bush administration 
intentionally did not tell the truth about the threat of Iraqi  weapons of mass destruction. 
 
At the time of this writing, the two main questions still remain.  Did the Bush administration 
intentionally not tell the truth about the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?  And did it 
not tell the truth so as to increase support for a war against Iraq? 
 
This article concludes that the Bush administration, other political organizations and leaders, and, in 
fact, all of us—regardless of our protestations to the contrary—cannot adequately defend against 
allegations and innuendos that we tell bald faced lies, bend the facts, and act by any means necessary to 
achieve a goal.  In this day and age, the very meaning of truth has imploded and been subverted by all of 
us who profess to be truth-tellers.  What’s more, protestations of truth-telling—especially about the 
putative lies of others—has become the first and last refuge not only of scoundrels but of us all. 
 
Before readers pray for the wrath of hail and brimstone upon the author or, perhaps, sigh with relief 
that the author has provided a free pass for misconduct and transgression, please consider the 
following. 
 
To intentionally lie, bend the facts, and act by any means necessary, one must know the truth that will 
be hidden even if this truth is that the truth is unknown.  The Bush administration has been accused of 
knowing some sort of truth about WMD and selectively using intelligence to support this truth.  This 
might be “smoking gun” evidence of intentionally lying, bending the facts, and acting by any means 
necessary if all extant intelligence clearly supported some other truth and the Bush administration knew 
this. 
 
Yet there have been previous times when all extant intelligence clearly supported some truth and the 
truth it supported turned out not to be the truth.  This occurs quite simply because—even with the best 
of intentions—intelligence officers and the policymakers who are the primary consumers of intelligence 
are ineluctably victims of imperfect methods of collecting, analyzing, producing, and transmitting 
information.  A preponderance of intelligence can strongly support one picture of the world, but this 
very preponderance is but an artifact constructed through the very absence of other information that 
was not collected or was inappropriately construed or discounted.   A case in point is the intelligence 
before the Persian Gulf War that seriously underestimated the scope of Iraqi nuclear weapons 
programs. 
 
Moreover, a strong case can be made that the Bush administration believed that WMD were an 
imminent threat or could be imminently enough to endanger United States (US) security interests unless 
the 2003 military invasion occurred.   And a strong case also can be made that the administration’s 
belief was based on a selective marshalling of intelligence, much as are the beliefs of intelligence 
analysts.  This selective marshalling encompasses conscious and unconscious employment of other 
sensations, perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, opinions, feelings, and motives—the constituents of the mind 
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even if the employment may be more suggestive of mindlessness.  Intentional lying, bending the facts, 
and acting by any means necessary are not an Issue here. 
 
However, let’s assume that the above exposition did not wash and there still remained the viable 
contention that the Bush administration did know that WMD did not exist or were not remotely 
representative of a significant threat to the US suggests—and still pressed on with the converse to 
increase support for the war.  What then? 
 
The history of the philosophy of ethics gives us several choices.  Means might supersede ends.  Ends 
might supersede means.  Both are extremely significant and merit consideration.  Both are irrelevant 
and anything or nothing goes.  Suffice it to say that we are all confronted with all choices concerning our 
own behavior and that of others on a daily basis.  The choices we make say something about how we are 
human but do not allow us to avoid being human. 
 
And tarring something or someone—the Bush administration, other political organizations and leaders, 
or any or all of us—with the brush of truth violator?  There are many truths that are congruent and 
contradictory, that talk to each other but also above and below and around and through each other, 
that apply to the actor but also the observer, that seem to last and seem to never even be transitory.  
Whole academic fields of inquiry—e.g., historiography, hermeneutics, semiotics, exegesis, philosophy of 
science, epistemology, logic, and objective and projective psychological assessment—are dedicated to 
which truths, if any, may be applicable in answering specific questions. 
 
The plain truth of the matter, as I hoist myself on my own truth petard, is that the only still-remaining 
constant of truth is not its meaning but its function.  Our truth professing—including asserting the truth 
violating of others—serves as means to achieve ends and, at times, means as an end.  The latter does 
not involve the quest for what, if anything, is real or what, if anything, is Good, but largely the 
experience of taking on a truth-telling role. 
 
One further conclusion.  In supporting or opposing the Bush administration on the questions of 
intelligence and WMD and the quest for war, we are supporting or opposing ourselves.  And that’s the 
truth.  (See Corn, D.  (July 21/28, 2003). WMD; Who knew what?  The Nation, pp. 6, 8; Kerr, P.  
(July/August 2003).  Bush administration defends intelligence findings on Iraq.  Arms Control Today. 
http://www.armscontrol.org ; Knowlton, B.  (July 17, 2003).  Bush and Blair defend decision to wage war 
in Iraq.  The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com;  Loughlin, S. (June 4, 2003). Bush 
administration: Intelligence data on Iraq was not manipulated.  CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com ; Moore, 
J.  (June 12, 2003).  Democrats talk of WMD intelligence investigation.  RepublicanDailyNews.com. 
http://www.gopusa.com ; Sanger, D.E., & Miller, J.  (July 23, 2003). National security aide says he’s to 
blame for speech error.  The New York Times, p. A11; Stevenson, R.W.  (July 19, 2003). White House tells 
how Bush came to talk of Iraq uranium.  The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; US Senate 
opens Iraq weapons probe.  BBC News.  http://news.bbc.co.uk. ) (Key Words: Bush Administration, Iraq, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, WMD.) 
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